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The Wages of Crying Wolf Revisited:
The Essential Consanguinity of Lochner, Roe,
and Eastern Enterprises
RONALD

J.

KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*

It [Roe v. Wade] is, nevertheless, a very bad decision. Not because it will

perceptibly weaken the Court-it won't; and not because it conflicts with
either my idea of progress or what the evidence suggests is society's-it
doesn't. It is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not
constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.'
In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe
v. Wade, 2 Professor John Hart Ely struck a cautionary note about the methodology used to justify the result. He worried that the sweeping scope of the
decision was difficult to justify, at least in textual terms when viewed against
the absence in the Constitution of any mention of a right to an abortion or, more
generally, even a "right of privacy." Because the Constitution "simply says
nothing, clear or fuzzy, about abortion,"3 Ely argued that the justices labored
under a special obligation to ground the right in some identifiable constitutional
value before disabling state governments from regulating abortion procedures.
This essay will explore-briefly and somewhat incompletely-the Supreme
Court's creation and enforcement of unenumerated constitutional rights. Although some conservative commentators claim that liberal activist judges, like
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, overstepped their
institutional role by recognizing and enforcing unenumerated constitutional
rights, the fact is that conservative justices have done exactly the same thing in
the service of property rights. The interesting question-and the question that
most legal scholars utterly fail to engage-is how to resolve the problem of
federal judges calling decisions that they dislike "judicial activism" while, at the
same time, creating new unenumerated constitutional rights themselves.
There are two intellectually honest potential solutions. Judges could admit,
fully and frankly, that they create and enforce unenumerated constitutional
rights. The challenge would be for the federal courts to offer up persuasive
rationales justifying this practice and delimiting when it constitutes legitimate
judicial behavior. After undertaking these definitional projects, the justices
ideally would then honor these self-described justifications and limitations.

* Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow and Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
1. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947
(1973).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Ely, supra note 1, at927.
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Alternatively, federal judges could get out of the business of amending the
Constitution by judicial fiat. This would mean that Griswold v. Connecticut4 and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey5 should be overturned, but it would also mean
7
6
that Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon and Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
should be abandoned. If history provides any guidance, the justices are virtually
certain not to follow such a course of action.
I. A PAGE OF

HISTORY: THE SUPREME COURT ROUTINELY HAS CREATED AND

ENFORCED UNENUMERATED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The Supreme Court initially disclaimed any intention of creating unenumerated constitutional rights. Constitutional law casebooks invariably reprint the
famous interchange between Justices Chase and Iredell in Calder v. Bull 8 to
show that, as a general proposition, the federal judiciary only enforces textual
constitutional rights. Justice Chase argued that "[t]here are acts which the
Federal, or State, Legislatures cannot do, without exceeding their authority." 9
He explained that "[a]n ACT of the Legislature (for I can't call it a law)
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered
a rightful exercise of legislative authority."' l
Justice Iredell emphatically rejected Justice Chase's natural rights theory of
federal judicial review. In his view, "[i]f any act of Congress, or of the
Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate
and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and
urgent case."" He also observed that:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and
the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could
properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an
equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges,
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice. 12
Most contemporary commentators took the position that Justice Iredell had the
better of this argument, and after Calder the Supreme Court largely abjured any

4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
7. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
8. 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386 (1798).
9. Id.at 388 (Chase, J.).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J.).
12. Id.
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3
power to recognize and enforce unenumerated constitutional rights. '
Nevertheless, in Dred Scott v. Sanford,"n one of the Supreme Court's most
infamous decisions, the justices created and enforced an unenumerated constitutional right to take a human slave into a free federal territory without affecting
his status as chattel property.' 5 "[T]he power of Congress over the person or
property of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power under our
Constitution and form of Government."' 6 The Missouri Compromise, which
prohibited slavery in certain United States territories, was void because:

[T]he rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed on the
same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process
of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committhe laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of
ted no offence against
17
due process of law.

Thus, no matter how careful the procedural values associated with the government's enforcement of the law abolishing slavery in certain territories, the law
violated a substantive limitation on the scope of the federal government's power
to regulate. Hence, the "substantive" aspect of the Due Process Clause ostensibly required the Supreme Court to invalidate the anti-slavery provisions of the
Missouri Compromise.
Following the Civil War, the Supreme Court continued to recognize substantive limitations on government action as incidents of the concept of "due
process of law." 18 With increasing regularity, the Supreme Court applied substantive due process to disallow state and federal labor and workplace safety
regulations. Lochner v. New York,' 9 a case in which the Supreme Court struck
down a New York state law limiting the maximum number of hours that a
person could be employed per day and per week in a bakery, serves as a kind of
shorthand for the Supreme Court's jurisprudential approach during this time
period.
Following the onset of the Great Depression, a variety of economic, social,

13. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756-59 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing
the Supreme Court's infrequent use of substantive due process to invalidate legislation in the pre-Civil
War era).
14. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
15. See id. at 499-552.
16. Id. at 449.
17. Id. at 450.
18. See Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S.
97, 102 (1878); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 759-61 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (listing and discussing early substantive due process cases in the post-Civil War era).
19. 198 U.S. 45, 53-58 (1905); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327-30 (1921).
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and political forces turned the tide against the practice of aggressive judicial

review of progressive health, safety, and welfare legislation. 20 The Supreme
Court contributed to this movement, sustaining virtually all state and federal
economic and social legislation challenged before it, save when the legislation
at issue implicated a fundamental right or utilized a suspect classification. 2 1
Thus, to a great extent, the Supreme Court simply abandoned its efforts to
superintend the legislative process.
Since the Supreme Court's repudiation of Lochner and its jurisprudential kin,
the received wisdom has been that the Supreme Court should not claim any
generalized power to second-guess basic economic and social policies established by Congress or the state legislatures.2 2 If economic or social legislation is
"rational," that is to say, if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest, then it is constitutional.2 3 On the other hand, if legislation burdens an
enumerated constitutional right, and the right in question is "implicit in the
24
concept of ordered liberty," the Supreme Court will apply heightened scrutiny.
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court overtly returned to

the business of applying more than rational basis scrutiny to economic and
social legislation, at least insofar as the legislation burdened an unenumerated,
but nevertheless "fundamental," right. 25 After Griswold, substantive due process once again served as a basis for invalidating state and federal legislation.2 6
This led conservative critics to suggest that, in the name of enforcing the
"liberty" aspect of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court had resurrected
the Lochner doctrine.27
If supporters of substantive due process protection of unenumerated liberty
rights are intellectually honest, they must concede that the post-Griswold
doctrine of substantive due process bears more than a passing resemblance to
Lochner.28 This concession, at least in my view, does not mean that the new
substantive due process jurisprudence is either mistaken or illegitimate. Embrac20. See ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
454-522 (6th ed. 1983).
21. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
22. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
486-88 (1955); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949).
23. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 486-88 ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.").
24. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (describing the process of selective
incorporation of certain provisions of the Bill of Rights against state governments); cf. Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243, 247 (1833).
25. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83 (1965).
26. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-67 (2000); BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 574-75 (1996); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1992); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-65 (1970).
27. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 28-32, 141-45 (1990).
28. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 555-68 (1997).
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ing Griswold would, however, preclude an intellectually honest person from
objecting to the judicial creation (or, if one prefers, "recognition") of other
unenumerated constitutional rights, including rights associated with economic
and property interests.2 9
Over the last twenty years, the Burger Court, and now the Rehnquist Court,
have expansively interpreted the Takings Clause to provide significant protection of property rights. 30 Liberal commentators often have been sharply critical
of these decisions, arguing that the federal courts generally should sustain
3
statutes that limit land use in order to promote legitimate community interests. 1
Professor Laurence H. Tribe, for example, has suggested that the contemporary
of property rights under the Takings Clause "borSupreme Court's protection
32
ders on fetishism."
Critics of the "new and improved" Takings Clause jurisprudence are not
generally as critical of other arguably activist Supreme Court rulings, notably
including those involving abortion rights.33 Methodologically, however, the

process that the liberal Roe majority relied upon to recognize a right to
terminate a pregnancy is identical to the process that the conservative majority
has deployed to expand the scope of the Takings Clause. 34 It is intellectually
dishonest simultaneously to praise one sort of activism but condemn another.
This is not to say that advocates of "judicial conservatism" have been
paragons of intellectual consistency. President Richard Nixon, at the time he
appointed Justices Rehnquist and Powell, said that he sought to nominate
"judicial conservatives" to the bench. By this, he meant jurists who would not
"twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal political
and social views." 3 5 Ironically, he went on to call for his new appointees to
re-orient constitutional criminal law to be more amenable to police officers and
prosecutors:

29. See id. at 583-90.
30. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713 (2002); see also E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-24 (1998) (plurality opinion) (applying the Takings Clause to invalidate
federal statute imposing retroactive financial obligations on companies that once employed now-retired
coal miners); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1994) (limiting conditional approvals of
building permits by imposing a proportionately test to govern the nexus requirement applicable to
conditional approvals of building permits); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-36
(1987) (requiring a nexus between government-imposed conditions on permission to make improvements to land and the problems that government claims the improvements would cause).
31. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power Public Value, and Private Rights, 26
ENvnI. L. 1, 5-10 (1996).
32. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-5, at 603 (2d ed. 1988); see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 174-79 (1985).
33. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
34. See Krotoszynski, supra note 28, at 605-07.
35. 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1431 (Oct. 25, 1971).
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As a judicial conservative, I believe some court decisions have gone too far in
the past in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in our
society. ... [T]he peace forces must not be denied the legal tools they need to
protect the innocent from criminal elements.36
Nor was President Nixon's inconsistency in calling for "judicial conservatives"
to overrule binding precedents particularly unusual. Senators Orrin Hatch and
Strom Thurmond routinely call for "judicial conservatism" while, at the same
time, seeking doctrinal revolutions in existing case law. 37 Robert Bork's recent
writings reflect this ideological multiple personality disorder.3a
Not surprisingly, the justices themselves fall prey to this kind of loose,
results-oriented reasoning. In the context of a substantive due process claim
challenging the State of Washington's third-party child visitation statute, Justice
Scalia opined that:
[W]hile I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative
chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to interfere
with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that
the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to
deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view)
3 9
that unenumerated right.

This is all well and good; yet, Justice Scalia has not flinched from enforcing
unenumerated rights in other contexts.
Strictly speaking, the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause does not apply
to the states; it is only by process of incorporation that any provision of the Bill
of Rights binds the state governments.4 ° Yet Justice Scalia has embraced very
41
broad interpretations of the Free Speech Clause. In R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,
Justice Scalia wrote an opinion for the Court invalidating a hate-speech ordinance on the theory that "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government

36. Id. at 1432.
37. See Anthony Lewis, Moving the Judges, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1998, at A15 ("I'm as strong a
proponent of an independent judiciary as there is.... But where I get tough is where the judges want to
make the law."); Excerpts From Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1993, at A12 (providing Senator Thurmond's understanding of the proper relationship between the
branches of the federal government, in which "the role of the judiciary is to interpret the laws"); Leo A.
Weiss, Democracy Doesn't Need Bork's Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1987, at A34 (describing
Senator Hatch's aversion to judges who "make laws").
38. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 95-119 (1996); BORK, supra note 27, at

4-9, 15-18, 261-65.
39. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("If only for the sake of its own preservation, the Court
should return this matter to the people-where the Constitution, by its silence on the subject, left
it-and let them decide, State by State, whether this practice should be allowed.").
40. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243, 247 (1833).
41. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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from proscribing speech.""2 Because "[tihe First Amendment does not permit
St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views
on disfavored subjects," the St. Paul ordinance failed to pass constitutional
muster.43
Justice Scalia was not content to leave the matter of whether hate speech
should be tolerated in St. Paul to the local city government. His reasons for
doing so cannot plausibly be labelled either "textualist" or "originalist." Rather,
adopting a very broad conception of the free speech guarantee, Justice Scalia
prohibited a local government from picking free speech winners and losers,
even within the universe of "fighting words" speech that arguably lies entirely
outside the protection of the First Amendment in the first place. 4 4 Thus, R.A. V
may be characterized as an "activist" decision.
A truly committed textualist or originalist should begin by considering the
text of the First Amendment, which provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'4 On its face, the
Amendment addresses itself not merely to the federal government, but to a
specific branch of the federal government-the Congress. From a textual perspective, incorporating this guarantee against the Executive or Judicial Branches
represents a stretch. Only by declaring the freedom of speech to be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" was the Supreme Court able to apply it
against the states (and only then decades after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment)." 6
Even after "incorporating" the First Amendment, serious disagreements existed among the justices as to whether the liberty interest protecting the freedom
of speech was entirely and exactly co-extensive with the Free Speech Clause.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, for example, argued that federalism principles
and proper application of substantive due process theory required the Supreme
Court to give the states a greater margin of appreciation to regulate speech than
the federal government should enjoy. 4 7 Although ostensibly committed to a
strong form of federalism, Justice Scalia has never embraced Justice Harlan's
bifurcated approach to protecting the freedom of speech.
Individual justices also have suggested that the federal courts owe some
margin of appreciation to legislation aimed at suppressing social harms caused
by speech activity. In the context of the speech squelching and anti-communist
Smith Act, Justice Felix Frankfurter observed that "[pirimary responsibility for

42. Id. at 382.
43. Id. at 391.
44. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (incorporating the First Amendment against the
states); but cf Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1907) (assuming for the sake of argument,
but not holding, that the First Amendment applies to the states).
47. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501-08 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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adjusting the interests which compete in the situation before us of necessity
belongs to the Congress. '4 8 He described the Supreme Court's duty in free
speech cases as "set[ting] aside the judgment of those whose duty it is to
49
legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it."
Thus, the result in R.A. V is hardly compelled by either the text of the First
Amendment or its subsequent case history. Yet, Justice Scalia readily displaces
the legislative judgment of the St. Paul city council to protect racist speech. This
represents not merely the enforcement of an unenumerated right (at least as
against the states), but also a very strong iteration of the unenumerated right. To
be clear, I do not necessarily think that Justice Scalia's decision in R.A.V was
incorrect. 50 My point is that, objectively viewed, R.A.V is an "activist" decision
enforcing an "unenumerated" right.
Returning to the context of the Takings Clause, Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 5 l constitutes a very "activist" approach
to applying the Takings Clause. At issue in the case was a retroactive funding
mechanism to pay for health care benefits for retired coal miners. Congress
imposed severe, retroactive funding obligations on the employers of now-retired
coal miners in the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992. Under the
funding mechanism, the Social Security Administration assessed Eastern Enterprises an annual premium in excess of five million dollars.5 2 Eastern Enterprises
brought a lawsuit challenging the assessment on substantive due process and
Takings Clause grounds.
Writing for a plurality of the Justices, Justice O'Connor opined that the
funding provision violated the Takings Clause by imposing severe, retroactive
liability on the retired coal miners' former employers.5 3 Because the funding
provision did not comport with basic notions of "justice" and "fairness," it
violated the Takings Clause.5 4
The plurality's approach to the Takings Clause effectively represents a re-

48. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49. Id.; see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION 176-248 (1960) (discussing the framing of the First Amendment and its original purpose,
principally ensuring the freedom of the press); MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (discussing how the postBrandenburg approach to the Free Speech Clause radically expands upon its historical scope); Richard
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (arguing for the recognition of a tort action for hate speech and
suggesting that such a tort would be more consistent with the original understanding of the scope of the
Free Speech Clause).
50. Even if government may proscribe certain categories of speech, this does not mean that it enjoys
the discretion to pick and choose which speech to suppress within the category based on either its
content or, worse yet, its viewpoint. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent, Free Speech, and the
Continuing Search for the "Central Meaning" of the FirstAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1631
n.60 (2000).
51. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
52. See id. at 517.
53. See id. at 528-29.
54. See id. at 523-24, 530-35.
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vived doctrine of substantive due process protection for economic interests.5 5
The text of the Takings Clause itself presupposes the legitimacy of the government's action: if government takes private property for a public purpose, it must
pay just compensation. 5 6 In Eastern Enterprises,however, the plurality did not
require the federal government to pay "just compensation," but simply voided
the law. The remedy, disallowing the government action, seems more consistent
with the Lochner-era doctrine of substantive due process than with the original
understanding of the Takings Clause.5 7
In sum, critics simply use "judicial activism" as a label to describe results
that they happen to dislike. Both liberal and conservative justices engage in the
identification and enforcement of unenumerated and atextual constitutional
rights. 58 For those who find this activity to be unseemly, there are two possible
solutions: the Supreme Court can either attempt to get out of the business of
enforcing atextual constitutional rights altogether, or it may rededicate itself to
providing a persuasive rationale that explains when the creation and enforcement of atextual constitutional rights is appropriate.
II.

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH THE WOLF: PRAGMATISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL PROCESS THEORY

It would be relatively easy for the justices to resolve the tension that presently
exists in their individual and collective voting patterns. Rather than disclaiming

any general intention to create and enforce unenumerated constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court should candidly admit that, at least since Dred Scott v.
Sandford,5 9 it has done just that and has no intention of abandoning this
practice.
The alternative would be for the justices to make a concerted effort to commit
themselves to strict textualism, and even this represents a kind of false faith,
because the text of many important provisions of the Constitution is so vague.
Justice Hugo Black famously proposed a kind of strict textualism, allowing no
room for the judicial recognition of any unenumerated rights. He followed this
rule, even in the face of very hard facts.6 ° It bears noting that he has been the

55. See Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 724-726, 736-738.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
57. See Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 732-740.
58. Ithardly seems reasonable to fault liberal justices for aggressively enforcing the concept of "due
process of law," which, after all, does appear in the text of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
while reading the remedial provision of the Takings Clause ("just compensation") out of existence.
Thus, whether or not a particular constitutional right is "unenumerated" is, to a large degree, in the eye
of the beholder.
59. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
60. For example, Justice Black would not have required states to observe, as a matter of constitutional law, the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal and involuntary commitment
judicial proceedings. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[t]he Constitution thus goes into some detail to spell out what kind of trial a defendant charged with a
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only justice committed to a rigidly textualist approach; even Justices Scalia and
Thomas abandon textualism (and originalism) when the right claims appear at
bar (for example, claims arising under the Free Speech Clause or the Takings
Clause). 6 ' Thus, the problem of federal judges recognizing unenumerated constitutional rights remains.
Moreover, blanket condemnations of the judicial recognition of unenumerated rights are not likely to be effective. Indeed, crying "Wolf!" might even
prove to be counterproductive. In his canonical article, Professor Ely argues that
the principal danger of crying "Wolf!" inheres in desensitizing the justices and
the academy to the real danger of unprincipled judicial decision making. In his
view, because so many of the decisions of the Warren Court had provoked cries
of "Lochner!," the jurisprudential epithet was losing all meaning (and effectiveness). Ely views Roe as a genuine danger to the institutional legitimacy of the
Supreme Court; for him, the case justified not a false cry of "Wolf!," but rather
constituted the real thing.
The answer to the problem might inhere in legal process values. For example,
Ely posits a particular duty on the part of the Supreme Court to justify its
decisions in terms of constitutional text. Because Justice Blackmun did not offer
an adequate textual anchor for the newly minted right to terminate a pregnancy,
Ely sees Roe as a radical break with past decisions:

crime should have, and I believe the Court has no power to add or subtract from the procedures set forth
by the Founders"). Similarly, while proclaiming, "I like my privacy as well as the next one," Black
declined to find an unenumerated right of privacy in either the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendments.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). He went on to explain that:
I repeat so as not to be misunderstood that this Court does have power, which it should
exercise, to hold laws unconstitutional where they are forbidden by the Federal Constitution.
My point is that there is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly
vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted
legislative bodies and set aside their laws because of the Court's belief that the legislative
policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption of
such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is
finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which I
believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.
Id. at 520-21; cf.Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
conscientious enforcement of the concept of due process of law requires judges to analyze the
fundamental fairness of laws and that the Constitution's text mandates that the federal judiciary
undertake this task).
61. Both Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to provide strong protections to commercial speech.
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). It is clear that the Framers did not think Macy's flyers enjoyed significant
protection under the Free Speech Clause; until the 1970s, commercial speech was assimilated into
economic activity. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942); see also Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-26 (1975). As a matter of textualism or originalism, the commercial speech
doctrine, at least as applied to the states, does not wash. But see Greater New Orleans Broadcasters
Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183-89 (1999) (invalidating ban on casino advertising in state
where casino wagering is otherwise lawful).
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What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable
from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the
specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions
they included, or the nation's governmental structure. Nor is it explainable in
terms of the unusual political impotence of the group
judicially protected
62
vis-a-vis the interest that legislatively prevailed over it.
Thus, Roe was an especially bad decision, even when judged against other
recent "activist" decisions.6 3
In Ely's view, the Constitution "simply says nothing, clear or fuzzy, about

abortion." 64 Even if a general right of privacy might be inferred from various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, this sort of inferential reasoning has concrete
limits: "[I1t seems to me entirely proper to infer a general right of privacy, so
long as some care is taken in defining the sort of right the reference will

support.' '65 This, Ely suggests, the Supreme Court utterly failed to do.
Thus, for Ely, Roe represents a return to Lochner.6 6 In fact, Roe is arguably a
worse decision than Lochner because in Roe the Supreme Court imposed a
compelling state interest test on abortion regulations whereas in Lochner the
Court merely applied a test of reasonableness. If the Supreme Court may
legitimately manufacture a right to terminate a pregnancy, giving little textual,
precedential, or historical support for its decision, it becomes very difficult to
criticize virtually any decision of the justices.
Ely laments that scholarly commentators had cried "Lochner!" too frequently
during the Warren Court years, thus blunting the effectiveness of the charge. 67
He wryly observes that:
One possible judicial response to this style of criticism would be to conclude
that one might as well be hanged for a sheep as a goat: So long as you're
going to be told, no matter what you say, that all you do is Lochner, you might
as well Lochner. Another, perhaps more likely in a new appointee, might be to
reason that since Lochnering has so long been standard procedure, "just one
more" (in a good cause, of course) can hardly matter. Actual reactions, of

62. Ely, supra note 1, at 935; see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1959) (arguing for principled constitutional adjudication and
suggesting that the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court depends upon such behavior).
63. Ely, supra note I, at 936-37 ("At times the inferences the Court has drawn from the values the
Constitution marks for special protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never before has its
sense of an obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking.").
64. Id. at 927.
65. Id. at 929 (emphasis added).
66. See id. at 937 ("According to the dissenters at the time and virtually all the commentators since,
the Court had simply manufactured a constitutional right out of whole cloth and used it to superimpose
its own view of wise social policy on those of the legislatures.").
67. See id. at 943-44 ("1 do wish 'Wolf!' hadn't been cried so often. When I suggest to my students
that Roe lacks even colorable support in the constitutional text, history, or any other appropriate source
of constitutional doctrine, they tell me they've heard all that before.").
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course, are not likely to be this self-conscious, but the critical style of offhand
dismissal may have taken its toll nonetheless. 6 8

The problem, then, is that prudential patterns of institutional restraint will wear
away over time, reducing the Supreme Court to little more than a National
Council of Revision for various federal and state laws.6 9
70
Of course, Professor Ely's warning has proven to be prescient. Bush v. Gore
represents the culmination of the approach to constitutional adjudication that
Justices Brennan and Blackmun pioneered-an approach now embraced from
time to time by most (if not all) of the top incumbent members of the Supreme
Court. Rather than honor disliked precedents, a justice should simply overrule
them. If a majority can't be mustered to overrule, the conscientious justice
should perpetually dissent from the disliked precedents. Further, rather than
abstain from judicial intervention when the amending process is underway, the
Supreme Court should simply extend 7 1 or preempt 72 the Article V proceedings.
Under this approach, the Supreme Court does not merely have the last word on
questions of constitutional meaning, but also has the power to usurp the
processes of constitutional amendment itself.
Principled conservatives, like Justices John Marshall Harlan and Lewis F.
Powell, responded to this new jurisprudential approach with abject horror. They
consistently opposed the aggressive use of the power of judicial review to
preempt political processes that might alter the structure of the Constitution
itself. They argued forcefully that the Supreme Court labors under an obligation
to exercise a modicum of self-discipline before interjecting itself into the most

68. Id. at 944.
69. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
116-21, 127-33, 171-72, 200-07 (1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 TermForeword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47-58, 79 (1961).
70. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
71. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966) (holding unconstitutional
poll taxes applicable to state and local elections, notwithstanding fact that Twenty-fourth Amendment to
abolish the poll tax for federal elections had been adopted only two years earlier); cf. id. at 680-82
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("But the fact that the coup de grace has been administered by this Court instead
of being left to the affected States or to the federal political process should be a matter of continuing
concern to all interested in maintaining the proper role of this tribunal under our scheme of government.").
72. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (opining that strict
scrutiny should be applied to gender-based classifications that burden women as a matter of equal
protection doctrine under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, even though the Equal Rights
Amendment was then pending before the states); cf. id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the
substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification by
the States. By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional
responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic
process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by
judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect
appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.").
ALEXANDER
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contentious issues of the day. Harlan and Powell honored the doctrine of stare
decisis and even applied holdings that they did not join when the questions
arose as matters of first impression. In sum, they respected and observed the
prudential doctrines that seek to limit the role of the Supreme Court in a system
ostensibly dedicated to democratic self-government.
This commitment to a limited judicial role led these justices to support
outcomes that might seem, and probably are, substantively unjust. San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez73 has always struck me as a decision
imposing terribly high costs on innocents: the children of parents who happen to
reside in poor school districts. Justice Powell was not insensitive to this either:
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied
too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative
thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary74 to
assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.
At other times, Justice Powell's commitment to justice overcame his commitment to formal process and legal doctrines. Plyler v. Doe arguably represents
such an event.75 Yet, in most cases, Justice Powell was a remarkably careful
jurist.
The contemporary Supreme Court does not enjoy the benefit of a single
justice as committed to institutional and legal process values as Justices Powell
and Harlan. Justice Souter's approach to constitutional adjudication arguably
comes closest to this ideal.7 6 He has explained "that adjudication under the Due
Process Clause is like any other instance of judgment dependent on commonlaw method, being more or less persuasive according to the usual canons of
critical discourse. 77 Both Justices Harlan and Powell approached cases involving substantive due process in just this fashion.78
It is beyond the scope of this essay to promote the merits of Justice Harlan's
approach to substantive due process doctrine. My argument is much more
limited: since Calder v. Bull, justices of the Supreme Court have routinely
claimed a right to recognize and enforce unenumerated constitutional rights.
They have done so in order to invalidate both federal and state legislation.
There is simply no reason to believe that they will cease engaging in the
practice any time soon. Accordingly, the best result one could realistically hope

73. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. Id. at 58.
75. See 457 U.S. 202, 237-41 (1982) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
76. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752, 756-73 (1997) (embracing Justice
Harlan's approach to substantive due process doctrine).
77. Id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring); see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-45 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (describing the concept of due process of law as a kind of continuum and suggesting that
"its content cannot be determined by reference to any code.").
78. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-01 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1977).
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to achieve would be the creation of a framework for the recognition of unenumerated constitutional rights and a meaningful commitment on the part of the
justices to respect it.
CONCLUSION
Calls of "judicial activism" would be better framed as criticisms of the
substance of the opinion at issue. In evaluating that substance, we should
examine whether the opinion is persuasive. That is to say, does the opinion
reflect reasons usually credited in constitutional adjudication, such as text,
precedent, history, and tradition? To the extent that such values are not adequately accounted for, has the authoring justice provided some persuasive
justification for the departure? Greater attention to legal process values, rather
than criticisms of particular substantive outcomes, would better serve the
federal courts and the academy. 79
The Rehnquist Court is neither more nor less activist than the Burger Court,
the Warren Court, and those that preceded them. 80 To be sure, the Rehnquist
Court's activism benefits different constituencies than did the Burger and
Warren Courts' efforts. Large corporations worried about the consequences of
punitive damages awards have done quite nicely.8' So have those pressing
"regulatory" takings claims. 82 Women seeking access to abortions 83 and persons
wishing the assistance of a physician in ending their lives 84 have not fared so

well. And so it goes.
John Hart Ely was correct to cry "Wolf!" at Roe. Whenever the Supreme
Court breaks major new jurisprudential ground without proffering an adequate explanation, the credibility of the Supreme Court as a judicial-as
opposed to political-institution suffers. Indeed, over time, such behavior
will expose the justices as little more than politicians dressed in black robes.
In light of cases like Bush v. Gore, there is good cause to fret over the legal
process values associated with contemporary constitutional adjudication.
But the reflexive application of hackneyed labels will do very little to
advance the dialogue.
In sum, the Rehnquist Court may be labeled "activist" by those who dislike
its decisions. One is reminded of the school yard chant that "sticks and stone

79. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for
Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 998-1010, 1047-51 (1999).
80. But see Michael J. Kiarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of ConstitutionalHistory, 89 CAL.
L. REv. 1721, 1763 (2001) (describing the Rehnquist Court as "arguably" the "most activist in
history").
81. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 585-86 (1996).
82. See E. Enters. v.Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
83. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
84. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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may break my bones, but names will never hurt me." So too in this case: shrill
attacks will do less to undermine the Rehnquist Court's legitimacy than careful
and thoughtful critiques of the results in particular cases, and more importantly,
the reasons offered in support of the results. Bush v. Gore represents a very
good place to start. Let's go to work.85

85. For an early effort at analyzing Bush v. Gore from a legal process prospective, see Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and
Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2002). See also Michael C. Dorf & Samual
Issacharoff, Can Process Theory ConstrainCourts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923 (2001).

